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Norton: Norton: Section 362(h)

Section 362(h):
Applicable to Corporate Debtors?
MaritimeAsbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co., Inc.
(In re Chateaugay Corp.)'
I. INTRODUCTION

When a debtor files a petition in bankruptcy, section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code creates an automatic stay that operates to halt any actions
that would affect the bankruptcy estate. Among the actions the automatic stay
prevents are foreclosure actions, tort actions against the debtor, setoff of a debt
owed to the debtor, or any actions that would "create, perfect or enforce" a
lien against the debtor's property. 2 The automatic stay is triggered when any
bankruptcy petition is filed, regardless of whether it is filed under Chapter 7,
11, 12, or 13. The automatic stay protects debtors because it prevents any
actions taken against them for a specified period; in essence, giving them
room to breathe. It also protects creditors by providing for an equitable
distribution of the bankruptcy estate so the fast-acting creditors are not the
only creditors who can collect their claims.4

1. 920 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Chateaugayfl].

2. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
3.

The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing
spell from his creditors.

It stops all collection efforts, all

harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be
relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598 § 362, 92 Stat 2570, 5840-41
(1978).

4.

The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it,
certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies
against the debtor's property. Those who acted first would
obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the
detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide
an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are
treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors goes against
equal treatment of creditors.
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In 1984, Congress made substantial amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
(the "Code").' Included in these amendments was a new provision, section
362(h), which provides the following remedy for stay violations: "An
individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages."6
Since its addition to the Code in 1984, section 362(h) has sparked debate
about its application in certain situations. Section 362(h) presents two major
questions: First, what did Congress mean when it referred to an "individual?"
Is an individual a natural person, or are corporations (artificial persons) and
partnerships also considered individuals? Second, if section 362(h) is not
available to a debtor when the automatic stay is violated because the debtor
does not qualify as an "individual," is there another remedy available to the
debtor for violations of the stay provision?
This Note will address whether corporate debtors qualify as individuals
entitled to recover damages for stay violations under section 362(h). In
addition, this Note will analyze civil contempt as an alternative when a
corporate debtor is denied access by the courts to section 362(h). The Second
Circuit in Chateaugay believed contempt was the answer for a corporate
debtor harmed by stay violations.
II. THE FACTS AND HOLDING
LTV Corporation ("LTV") and some of its affiliates filed a petition for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Code on July 17, 1986. 7 Shortly afterwards,
Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic ("MALC"), an organization that handles
litigation for merchant seamen who were exposed to asbestos while at sea,

5. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat) 333.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988) (emphasis added). The legislative histdry of section
362(h) states:
Subsection (h), added by the 1984 amendments, should dispel any doubts
as to the sanctions that may be imposed for willful violation of the
automatic stay apart from contempt proceedings. Under subsection (h), an
individual injured by willful violation of the stay "shall" recover the actual
damages suffered, including costs and counsel fees. Additionally, in
appropriate circumstances, the court may, in its discretion, award punitive
damages. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs (98 Stat)
333.
7. ChateaugayII, 920 F.2d at 183.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/8
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filed proofs of claims on behalf of 157 maritime asbestos claimants.8 Each
claimant sought damages of $1 million, alleging personal injuries from
exposure to asbestos while on LTV owned or operated ships. 9
In July of 1988, MALC, representing 220 merchant seamen exposed to
asbestos, initiated lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigai.' 0 Three of these actions named LTV as a defendant.' These
actions were dismissed once LTV informed MALC that MALC had violated
the automatic stay when it filed the lawsuits.U
In March of 1989, while LTV's Chapter 11 proceeding was still pending,
MALC filed amended complaints for 1373 asbestos plaintiffs with the District
Thirty-eight of the amended
Court for the Northern District of Ohio.1
complaints named LTV as a defendant. 4 When LTV was served with these
complaints, it filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York requesting the court (1) to enjoin prosecution of the 38
amended complaints because they violated the automatic stay, and (2) to
award damages against MALC under sections 105(a) and 362(h) of the
Bankruptcy Code.' 5
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, granted a
permanent injunction against the prosecution of the 38 claims.' 6 The court
also awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $7,600 after concluding
that MALC's initiation of the asbestos actions constituted a willful violation
of the automatic stay. 7 Finally, the court held LTV's request for contempt
sanctions under section 105(a) in abeyance.'8

8. Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co., Inc. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 112 Bankr. 526, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) [hereinafter Chateaugay 1].
9. Id.
10. ChateaugayII, 920 F.2d at 183.
11. Id.
12. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). These actions were related to asbestos
actions pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
Chateaugay I, 920 F.2d at 183.
13. ChateaugayI, 112 Bankr. at 528.
14. Chateaugay II, 920 F.2d at 183-84. This number included amended
complaints on behalf of the three plaintiffs whose claims had been dismissed from the
litigation in the Eastern District of Michigan in 1988. Id. at 184.
15. Id. at 184. This time LTV did not inform MALC that by filing the amended
complaints MALC had violated the automatic stay. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The court concluded that the violation of the stay was willful because
MALC had knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding by virtue of the dismissal of the
actions in the Eastern District of Michigan. ChateaugayI, 112 Bankr. at 528.
18. Chateaugay II, 920 F.2d at 184.
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. MALC appealed the injunction and award of damages to the District
Court for the Southern District of New York.19 MALC asserted that the
bankruptcy court's authority to award damages under section 362(h) was not
applicable for two reasons. First, section 362(h) authorizes an award of

damages to an individual debtor, and LTV, a corporate debtor, was not an
individual." Second, even if section 362(h) was applicable, damages were
not appropriate because MALC's violation of the stay, though reckless, 21 was
not willful since LTV did not prove that MALC intended to violate the
stay. 22
The district court concluded that MALC's violation of the automatic stay
was willful even though a computer programmer error resulted in the filing of
those lawsuits.' It further held that LTV, a corporate debtor, could recover
damages under section 362(h) even though the statute limited recovery to
individual debtors? 4
MALC appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals asserting that
LTV could not recover damages under section 362(h) because the term
"individual" did not encompass corporate debtors. 25 The Second Circuit
agreed with MALC, holding that section 362(h) was not available to corporate
debtors because "individual" did not include corporations under the Code.26
While it took away a remedy with one hand, the Second Circuit provided LTV
with another avenue to redress its injury: seeking damages through a civil
contempt proceeding. 27

19. Id. The appeal of the injunction was withdrawn by stipulation of the parties.
Id.
20. ChateaugayI, 112 Bankr. at 528-29.

21. MALC testified that the amended complaints were served on LTV in error as
a result of a computer programming error. Id. at 528.
22. Id. at 529. MALC presented several other reasons for appeal which this Note
will not address. See id. at 528-29.

23. Id. at 530-32.
24. Id. at 532-33. The District Court relied on Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes
of Va., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986). ChateaugayI, 112 Bankr. at 532-33. See
infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text for discussion of Budget Service. The district
court further cited numerous bankruptcy court decisions supporting this conclusion.
See Chateaugay1, 112 Bankr. at 533.
25. Chateaugay1, 920 F.2d at 184.

26. Id. at 184-86.
27. Id. at 187. The court stated: "For [non-individual] debtors, contempt
proceedings are the proper means of compensation and punishment for willful
violations of the automatic stay." Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/8
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Im. THE CouRTS DEFINE "INDIVIDUAL"

Before Chateaugay, only two other United States courts of appeals had
decided whether the term "individual" included corporations. Both courts had
held that the term "individual" in section 362(h) included a corporation.
In Budget Service Co. v. Better Homes of Virginia, Inc.,'2 Budget
Service, a motor vehicle leasing company, twice attempted to repossess leased
vehicles after nonpayment by Better Homes, a corporation. Because Budget
Service's repossession attempts occurred after Better Homes had filed a
bankruptcy petition, its actions'violated the automatic stay." Consequently,
the bankruptcy court found Budget Service in civil contempt of court and
imposed sanctions, and the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination."
Budget Service appealed, challenging the authority of the bankruptcy
court to hold it in civil contempt. 31 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision. The court stated that it did not have to address the contempt
issue because the bankruptcy court clearly had'authority under section 362(h)
to award damages to Better Homes.3"
The court examined the legislative history of the automatic stay33 and
concluded that the term "individual"34 included corporate debtors. 35 It
supported its conclusion by reasoning that section 362(h) had to be read "in
conjunction with the rest of section 362," which did not limit its application

to "individuals."36 The court concluded that narrowly defining "individual"
as natural persons would frustrate the purpose of the automatic stay because
artificial entities such as corporations or partnerships would be denied a
remedy for violations of the automatic stay. 7 The court essentially interpreted section 362(h) broadly so it was available to all debtors.
The other appellate case that faced this issue before Chateaugay was
Cuffee v. Atlantic Business & Community Development Corp. (In re Atlantic

28. 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986).

29. Id. at 290. When Better Homes filed its petition in bankruptcy, the automatic
stay "went into effect by operation of law." Id.
30. Id. at 291.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 291-92.
33. See supra notes 3 and 4.
34. The Bankruptcy Code does not define individual. Budget Serv., 804 F.2d at
292.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Business & Community Corp.).38 In that case, the Third Circuit also
concluded that section 362(h) was available to corporate debtors.39 In
Atlantic Business, the debtor operated a radio station on premises it leased
under a tenancy at sufferance from James Cuffee.' After the debtor filed
bankruptcy, Cuffee attempted to terminate the tenancy by sending notice to
Atlantic Business. Also, to evict Atlantic Business Cuffee installed new locks
while radio station personnel were in the building.41 The Third Circuit held
that this was a willful violation of the automatic stay and assessed damages
against Cuffee under section 362(h). 42 Stating that section 362(h) "has
uniformly been held to be applicable to a corporate debtor," the court relied
on Budget Service and did not add any new analysis regarding the proper
interpretation of section 362(h) and the legislative history of section 362. 4I
The Eighth Circuit has not addressed this issue; however, bankruptcy
courts within the Eighth Circuit have concluded that "individual" does include
a corporation." A few courts have concluded that corporations could not

38. 901 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1990).
39. Id. at 329. The court stated that "[a]lthough Section 362(h) refers to an
individual, the section has uniformly been held to be applicable to a corporate debtor."
Id. (citing Budget Serv., 804 F.2d at 292).'
40. Id. at 326.
41. Id. at 326-27.
42. Id. at 327-29.
43. Id. at 329.
44. There are two decisions by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

Western District of Missouri that have allowed corporate debtors to utilize the remedy
given to "individuals" under § 362(h). The first, Jim Nolker Chevrolet-BuickOldsmobile, Inc. v. Richie (In re Jim Nolker Chevrolet-Buick Oldsmobile, Inc.), 121
Bankr. 20 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990), held that "individual" includes corporate debtors.
The court reasoned that "for every wrong there is a remedy," and, because the Eighth
Circuit had never decided the issue, the court elected to follow the only two other
circuits that had decided the issue, and extend protection to corporate debtors "as well
as a flesh-and-blood individual debtor." Id. at 22. Interestingly, the court stated it
could have reached the same conclusion using its equitable powers under § 105(a) of
the Code via a civil contempt order. Id. at 22.
The second decision is In re M & J Feed Mill, Inc., 112 Bankr. 985 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1990). In this case, the court allowed a corporate debtor to recover
damages for a stay violation under § 362(h). Id. at 989. Unfortunately, the court
failed to address the issue of allowing a corporate debtor to use § 362(h). Id. This,
however, is not unusual. See In re B. Cohen & Sons Caterers, Inc., 108 Bank. 482
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)(permitted corporate debtor to use § 362(h) without discussing
whether corporation was included in the definition of "individual"); In re Santa Rosa
Truck Stop, Inc., 74 Bankr. 641 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987).
That the Missouri bankruptcy courts would allow corporate debtors to utilize the
§ 362(h) remedy is not unusual. There are numerous decisions by United States
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/8
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utilize section 362(h) because the statute limited recovery to individuals. 45
No appellate court, however, had adopted this reasoning. Against this
backdrop, the stage was set for the Second Circuit in Chateaugay.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
MALC appealed the district court's decision upholding the award of
damages under section 362(h) to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Although MALC initially presented four grounds for
Second Circuit.4
conceded three, which left only a single issue for the
it
subsequently
appeal,
Second Circuit to decide: whether section 362(h) permits corporate debtors
to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.47
The court began its analysis by explaining a basic rule of statutory
construction adopted by the United States Supreme Court: "[A]s long as the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally8 is no need for a
court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute."4
The court noted, however, that this rule does not apply when its application
the
would frustrate the purpose of the statute; rather, in such a situation,
49
statute.
the
of
meaning
plain
the
over
prevail
should
intention
drafters'
After explaining its rule of statutory construction, the court proceeded to
analyze section 362(h) and its application to LTV's request for damages. The
court began by attempting to define "individual"-something Congress
neglected to do 5 ---by comparing it with a term that Congress did
define-person. The Code defines "person" as an "individual, partnership, and

bankruptcy courts that held that corporate debtors are included in "individual," thus
allowing recovery under § 362(h). See AP Indus., Inc. v. SN Phelps & Co. (In re AP
Indus., Inc.), 117 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Mallard Pond Partners v.
Commercial Bank & Trust Co. (In re Mallard Pond Partners), 113 Bankr. 420 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1990) (Not only was corporation included in "individual," but partnership
was also included. Id. at 423. The court cited BLACK'S LAw DICrIoNARY 913
(revised 4th ed. 1968) because its definition of "individual" stated that there are times
when the term "individual" does include artificial persons.); Schewe v. Fairview
Estates (In re Schewe), 94 Bankr. 938 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989); Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc. v. Auto-Use (In re Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc.),
50 Bankr. 250 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985).
45. See First Republicbank Corp v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank (In re First
Republicbank Corp.), 113 Bankr. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989); In re Brilliant Glass,
Inc., 99 Bankr. 16 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (contempt was an appropriate remedy).
46. ChateaugayII, 920 F.2d at 184.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989)).
49. Chategeaugay,920 F.2d at 184.
50. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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corporation" 5' The court then illustrated examples in the Code where
individuals and persons are given different rights.5 2
The court concluded that under the plain meaning rule, "individual"
connoted a natural person; consequently, a corporation could not avail itself
of the damages remedy available to individuals under section 362(h). 3 The
court recognized, however, that the other circuits that had addressed the issue
These circuits
allowed section 362(h) to benefit corporate debtors.'
reasoned that "[b]ecause the automatic stay under [section] 362(a) applies to
all debtors, it is unlikely that Congress meant in [section] 362(h) to award
damages for violating the stay only to individual debtors.""5
In Chateaugay,the Second Circuit rejected this reasoning as inappropriate. The court reasoned that following the plain meaning rule did not frustrate
the intent of the drafters because under its analysis, debtors that were
precluded from recovering under section 362(h) could use civil contempt to
recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.5 6 Therefore,
the Third and Fourth Circuits should not have expanded the definition of
individual to include corporations. 57 In further support of its holding, the
court noted that section 362(h) was added to the Code in 1984 as part58of the
Consumer Credit Amendments, which relate solely to natural persons.
V. ANALYSIS

The Second Circuit emphasized that it was required to follow the rule of
statutory construction adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ron
PairEnterprises. 9 Ron Pairstated two rules that courts interpreting statutes
must follow: (1) if the statute has a plain meaning, it must be followed,
unless affording the statute its plain meaning would frustrate its purpose; and
(2) in such cases, the intent of the drafters should prevail over the plain
meaning of the statute.6'

51. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1988).
52. Chateaugay I, 920 F.2d at 184-85.

53. Id. The court noted the absence of legislative history to indicate a "drafting
error or other inadvertence." Id. at 185. See supra note 6.
54. Chateaugay I, 920 F.2d at 185. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying

text.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Chateaugay11,920 F.2d at 185.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 185-86. See supra notes 33-37 & 43 and accompanying text.
Chateaugay11,920 F.2d at 186.

59. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
60. Id. at 240-41.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/8
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A. Individual Does Not Include Corporation

The first question is whether the term "individual" has a plain meaning.
After an examination of section 101,61 the "Definitions" section of the Code,
it is apparent that when Congress used the word "individual" it did not mean
to include a corporation.6 2 The Second Circuit provided a number of
examples to illustrate that a corporation and an individual are different entities.
First, section 101(35) defines "person" to include individuals, corporations,
and partnerships.63 Thus, "person" is essentially an umbrella term, encompassing both natural persons (individuals) and fictitious persons (corporations
and partnerships). Second, various Code sections give rights to persons, while
others give rights solely to individuals.' Third, section 109, entitled "Who
may be a debtor," refers to persons in some instances and to individuals in
others.65 Additionally, Chapter 13 is "available only to an 'individual with
regular income.., or an individual with regular income and such individual's
spouse."" s It is well settled that Chapter 13 is not available to corporations.
Finally, section 101(39) defines "relative" as an "individual related by affinity
or consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law,
or individual in a step or adoptive relationship within such third degree." 67
Without legislative history indicating that Congress meant to use the term
"person" rather than "individual" in section 362(h), the court refused to
substitute the definition of person for that of individual.(
In a case decided before Chateaugay,the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Texas used the same line of reasoning as the
Second Circuit, but cited additional examples to illustrate that a corporation
is not an individual. 69 For example, sections 101(30)(A) and (B) distinguish
persons who-are insiders of the debtor (1) when the debtor is an individual
and (2) when the debtor is a corporation." Moreover, section 101(17)"' of
the Code defines a family farmer as an "individual or individual and spouse."
Based on the above, the Chateaugay court concluded that "individual" does

61. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
62. Id.

63. Chateaugay11, 920 F.2d at 184.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 185. Obviously, only natural persons can have spouses.
67. Id. at 185-86. Consanguinity has no application in the corporate world.
68. Id. at 186.
69. First Republicbank Corp. v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank (In re First Republicbank
Corp.), 113 Bankr. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
70. Id. at 278-79.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 101(7) (1988).
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have a plain meaning of a natural person, which therefore precludes
corporations from being considered an individual for purposes of section
362(h). 72

Under the Supreme Court's statutory construction analysis laid down in
Ron Pair,the next step is to determine if defining "individual" as a natural
The
person frustrates the drafters' purpose for enacting section 362.' 3
Second Circuit concluded that it did not because there was another remedy
available to the corporate debtor for violations of the automatic stay: civil
contempt. 74 Provided all debtors have a remedy' for stay violations, the
purpose of the stay-to protect both debtors and their creditors 7 5 -is met
because there is disincentive to violate the automatic stay. 76 In Chateaugay,
-the Second Circuit concluded that because the purpose of the statute was not
frustrated, the plain meaning of the statute controlled. Thus, the term
"individual" in section 362(h) does not include a corporation.77
The Second Circuit's argument is well reasoned and extremely persuasive. Whether or not the second prong of the Ron Pair test 78 is met,
however, depends on if corporate debtors can obtain redress against creditors
who violate the automatic stay.79 Provided bankruptcy courts have authority
to use civil contempt citations, the second prong of the Ron Pairtest is met
and the plain meaning of the term "individual" in section 362(h) is applied.
If, however, bankruptcy courts do not have authority to use civil contempt,

72. Chateaugay11, 920 F.2d at 186.
73. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that Budget
Service, which held that corporate debtors were individuals for purposes of § 362(h)
was decided prior to Ron Pair,which instructed courts on proper construction of the
Code. FirstRepublicbank, 113 Bankr. at 279.
74. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. The First Republicbank court
reached the same conclusion.
75. See supra notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
76. The court reasoned that generally the stay provisions applied to all debtors.
Because § 362(h) was added later, as part of the Consumer Credit Amendments
(numerous amendments relating solely to individuals), it was possible that Congress
was particularly concerned with violations of the stay where the debtor was an
individual. Chateaugay1H, 920 F.2d at 186. For example, a creditor may be more
inclined to violate the stay of an individual debtor because a corporation is likely more
aware of its rights in bankruptcy than an individual. Id.
77. Id. at 185-87. The court concluded: "In the face of the statute's plain
meaning and without evidence of a contrary legislative intention, even if we thought
11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1988) would better serve the Code's purposes by being applied
to all debtors, we could do no more than invite Congress to change the result." Id. at
187.
78. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 81-122 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/8
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then the purpose of the automatic stay is frustrated. Thus, the interpretation
of section 362(h) upheld in Atlantic Business and Budget Service would be
correct because, under this interpretation, the purpose of the statute is
achieved 80
B. Contempt as a Remedy
In the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, Congress granted broad jurisdiction to the
newly created bankruptcy courts 8 ' In Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,82'the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the
constitutionality of 1978 Act based on the argument that it encroached upon
the powers of article Ill courts! 3 In a lengthy opinion, a plurality 84 held
that the 1978 Act was unconstitutional because "Art. III bars Congress-from
establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related
to those arising under the bankruptcy laws."85
In response to NorthernPipeline,Congress made substantial amendments
to Code provisions. Among the Code sections changed were section

105(a),'

which gives bankruptcy courts the authority to take any steps

80. The Third and Fourth Circuits would permit any debtor to use § 362(h) to
recover damages for stay violations. See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
81. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54
(1982) ("[T]he Act grants the new courts jurisdiction over all 'civil proceedings arising
under title 11 [the Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to cases under title
11."'(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1976)) (emphasis in original). The Act
also expressly granted to Bankruptcy Courts the authority to hold parties in contempt
of court. See infra note 98.
82. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The facts that gave rise to Northern Pipeline are as
follows: Northern Pipeline filed bankruptcy in 1980. Because the Act allowed
bankruptcy courts to decide matters related to the Bankruptcy Code, Northern Pipeline
also filed suit in bankruptcy court seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of
warranty, coercion, misrepresentation, and duress. Id. at 56. Marathon motioned to
dismiss, claiming the 1978 act was unconstitutional because it "conferred Art. III
judicial power upon judges who lacked life tenure and protection against salary
diminution;" therefore, the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
second suit. Id. at 56-57.
83. Id. at 56-57.
84. Brennan, J. wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Marshall,
Blackmun, and Steven JJ. Id. at 1. Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ. concurred in the
judgement, but limited the holding to the facts of Northern Pipeline. Id. White,
Burger, and Powell JJ., dissented. Id.
85. Id. at 76. The court stated that it was impermissible to remove judicial power
from an article III court and vest it in a non-article III adjunct. Id. at 87.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988) is entitled "Power of Court" and provides:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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necessary to carry out title 11 provisions, and section 157 of title 28, 81 which
gives bankruptcy courts the power to decide title 11 cases including core
proceedings arising under title 11. Courts that have denied corporate debtors
the remedy of section 362(h) have used one or both of these provisions to
support the theory that a bankruptcy court has the authority, either by statute
or constitution, to find a creditor who violates the automatic stay in civil
contempt and to enforce the contempt order by imposing damages on the
violating creditor. 88
In In re William L. Magwood, 111,89 the United*States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia raised important questions regarding the authority
of a bankruptcy court to use contempt: whether there is statutory authority for
a bankruptcy judge to issue a citation for contempt; whether this statutory
authority is constitutional; and whether the bankruptcy courts' use of contempt

(a) The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title ....
. . (c) The ability of any district judge or other officer or
employee of a district court to exercise any of the authority or
responsibilities conferred upon the court under this title shall be
determined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge,
officer, or employee set forth in title 28. This subsection shall
not be interpreted to exclude bankruptcy judges and other
officers or employees appointed pursuant to chapter 6 of title 28
from its operation.
*

Id.

87. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) is entitled "Procedures" and provides:
(a) Each district court may provide that any or all cases under
title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to
the bankruptcy judges for the district.
(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases
under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in a case under title 11, referred under subsection (a) of
this section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments,
subject to review under section 158 of this title.
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to(A) matters concerning the administration of the
estate;
Id. (emphasis added).
88. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
89. 785 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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power is constitutional. 90 Courts have attempted to answer these questions
in the cases since 1984, and have reached differing conclusions.
Civil contempt citations are used to "coerce compliance with the court's
order or to compensate an injured party for losses sustained because of the
contemptuous behavior. The sanctions in a civil contempt must not be
punitive." 9' While article III courts have inherent contempt power, article I
courts do not.92 There is a great deal of confusion surrounding whether
bankruptcy courts have civil contempt powers.'
Opinions vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 4 Thus, it is necessary to examine the competing
arguments set forth in these recent decisions.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that bankruptcy courts have clear statutory
authority to issue civil contempt orders in Burd v. Walters (In re Walters).95
The court reached its conclusion after examining section 10596 of the Code,
stating that it saw no reason not to give the statute its plain meaning.97 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that because Congress had conferred contempt powers
upon the bankruptcy courts at one time, 98 it was not inconsistent that it
would do so on another occasion. 99

90. Id. at 1078 n.1. The court was able to duck the questions it raised by finding
that the contempt sanctions were improper. Id.
91. Id. at 1081.
92. Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd., Inc.), 827 F.2d 1281,
1284 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
93. The same is true regarding criminal contempt. See, e.g., Griffith v. Oles (In
re Hipp), 895, F.2d 1503, 1509-21 (5th Cir. 1990) (exercise of criminal contempt by
bankruptcy court is not authorized); Sequoia, 827 F.2d at 1284 (no inherent

(constitutional) authority for exercise of either criminal or civil contempt); Tele-Wire
Supply Corp. v. Presidential Financial Corp., Inc. (In re Indus. Tool Distribs., Inc.),
55 Bankr. 746, 748 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (bankruptcy courts lack statutory authority to
determine criminal contempt). Contra FED. R. BANKR. 9020, see infra text
accompanying note 118 (appears to authorize bankruptcy judges to determine contempt
without distinguishing between criminal or civil); Bratton v. Mitchell (In re Bratton),
117 Bankr. 430, 437 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (if criminal contempt involves imprisonment,
must follow Rule 9020); Yaquinto v. Greer, 81 Bankr. 870, 881 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (had
Rule 9020 (as amended in 1987) been effective and followed when this criminal
contempt was entered, would have upheld); In re Wright, 75 Bankr. 414, 416 (M.D.
Fla. 1987) (when entering criminal contempt, must follow Rule 9020).
94. See infra notes 95-122 and accompanying text.
95. 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989).
96. See supra note 86 for the text of § 105.
97. Walters, 868 F.2d at 669.
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 1481 (repealed 1978).
99. Walters, 868 F.2d at 669.
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The court then decided whether Congress could constitutionally give
contempt power to the bankruptcy courts. The starting point was Northern
0
Pipeline."
The court distinguished Northern Pipeline because that case
involved the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a state-created right." 1 In
Walters, the right involved was a right created by Congress.1" The court
quoted the plurality in Northern Pipeline:
[W]hen Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion, in
defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or
prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate
that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform
specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right. Such provisions do, in
a sense, affect the exercise of judicial power, but they are also incidental to
Congress' power to define the right that it has created. 10 3
The court reasoned that because Congress can create the right, it follows that
Congress can constitutionally grant an article I court the power to enforce its
orders through the contempt power. 1' 4 The court held that the exercise of
contempt power by a bankruptcy court was "'incidental to Congress' power
to define the right it has created.""' 5
Other courts have focused on whether contempt for violation of the
automatic stay is a core proceeding under section 157 of title 28, and
overwhelmingly hold that it is."°
Characterizing contempt as a core
proceeding is essential because section 157 of title 28 permits bankruptcy
judges to hear, determine, and enter appropriate orders for all cases arising
under title 11.107 When section 157 is coupled with section 105(a), which
permits judges to enter any order necessary to execute the provisions of title

100.
101.
102.
103.

See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82.
Walters, 868 F.2d at 670.
Id. (citing NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. at 83).

104. Walters, 868 F.2d at 670.
105. Id.
106. See Mountain America Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d
444, 448 (10th Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d
289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986); Haile v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 90
Bankr. 51, 54 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); AP Indus., Inc. v. SN Phelps & Co. (In re AP Indus.,
Inc.), 117 Bankr. 789, 798 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Dubin v. Jakobowski (In re
Stephen W. Grosse, P.C.), 84 Bankr. 377, 386 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Gibbons v.
Haddad (In re Haddad), 68 Bankr. 944, 948 (Bankr. D. Mass 1987); United States
Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In re McLean Indus.), 68 Bankr. 690 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986).
107. See supra note 87.
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11, 8'the provisions offer a persuasive argument that Congress impliedly
conferred contempt powers on bankruptcy courts." °
Further, a few courts have upheld orders of contempt by the bankruptcy
courts without discussing the statutory or the constitutional authority for doing
so.110 Conversely, one held that an assertion of contempt power by the
bankruptcy courts is unconstitutional."'
The Ninth Circuit, in Plastirasv. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd.,
Inc.)," declined to decide the constitutional issue, but held there was
neither express nor implied statutory authority for bankruptcy courts to
exercise contempt powers. The court was not convinced that because
bankruptcy judges were given jurisdiction over core proceedings" 3 that
contempt was included in those powers."' It did not consider section 105
a source of contempt power because it was too broad." 5 Interestingly, the
Ninth Circuit's holding does not preclude a finding of contempt: according to
the court, the bankruptcy judge6 merely had to certify the issue to the district
court for that judge to decide."
Courts also rely on Rule 9020" 7 to uphold civil contempt determinations made by bankruptcy courts. The United States Supreme Court
promulgates the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure." 8 In 1987, Rule 9020 was
amended to include the following:
(a)Contempt Committed in Presence of Bankruptcy Judge. Contempt
committed in the presence of a bankruptcy judge may be determined

108. See supra note 86.
109. See Skinner, 917 F.2d 444 at 447; Haile, 90 Bankr. at 54; Grosse, 84 Bankr.
at 385-86; Kellogg v. Chester, 71 Bankr. 36, 37 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
110. See In re Elias, 98 Bankr. 332, 337 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); Schewe v.
Fairview Estates (In re Schewe), 94 Bankr. 938, 946 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989)
(would have upheld contempt sanctions if contempt had been appropriate).
111. See Tele-Wire Supply Co. v. Presidential Financial Corp., Inc. (In re
Industrial Tool Distribs., Inc.), 55 Bankr. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
112. 827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987).
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)(2) (1988).
114. Sequoia, 827 F.2d at 1289.
115. Id. at 1290.
116. Id. at 1291. See also In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 Bankr. 16, 18 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1988); Omega Equip. Corp. v. John C. Louis Co., Inc. (In re Omega Equip.
Corp.), 51 Bankr. 569 (D. D.C. 1985).
117. FED. R. BANKR. 9020.
118. United States Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In re McLean Indus.,
Inc.), 68 Bankr. 690, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (The court noted that the Supreme
Court amended Rule 9020 after its decision in Northern Pipeline.).
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summarily by a bankruptcy judge. The order of contempt shall recite the
facts and shall be signed by the bankruptcy judge and entered of record.
(b) Other Contempt. Contempt committed in a case or proceeding
pending before a bankruptcy judge, except when determined as provided in
subdivision (a) of this rule, may be determined by the bankruptcy judge
only after a hearing on notice. The notice shall be in writing, shall state the
essential facts constituting the contempt charged and describe the contempt
as criminal 9 or civil and shall state the time and place of hearing,
allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense. The notice
may be given on the court's own initiative or on application of the United
States attorney or by an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose.
(c) Service and Effective Date of Order; Review. The clerk shall serve
forthwith a copy of the order of contempt on the entity named therein. The
order shall be effective 10 days after service of the order and shall have the
same force and effect as an order of contempt entered by the district court,
unless, within the 10 day period, the entity named therein serves and files
with the clerk objections prepared in the manner provided in Rule 9033(b).
If timely objections are filed, the order shall be reviewed as provided in
Rule 9033 [de novo standard of review].

While Rule 9020 expressly authorizes bankruptcy courts to determine
contempt, the Advisory Committee Note to the 1987 Amendment to Rule
9020 notes that "[t]his rule, as amended, recognizes that bankruptcy judges
may not have the power to punish for contempt."' 20 Some courts, however,
have rejected this theory2 1 and have used this rule alone or coupled with

119. Note that the rule indicates that bankruptcy courts can determine criminal
contempt. This Note solely addresses civil contempt.
120. FED. R. BANKR. 9020 advisory committee's note.
121. See In re Kennedy, 80 Bankr. 673 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987) in which the court
expressly rejected the theory that bankruptcy courts do not have contempt enforcement
powers.
It would be anomalous that this court should not have the power to enforce
obedience to that kind of judgment and order by civil contempt but merely
find the disobeying party in contempt and report it to the District Court.
The anomaly is apparent. The Rule provides that the Bankruptcy
Court has the right to determine contempt but not the power to punish.
Such a determination could be an exercise of futility in the event no timely
objection is entered to the determination. The reason for that being that
under Bankruptcy Rule 9020(c) no objection to a finding of contempt
means no review of facts. If there was a finding of contempt, it is hard to
believe that the contemnor would file an objection which could very likely
result in punishment being imposed when, if no objection is imposed, he is
home free. There would be a public record that a contempt was found but
nothing happens if there is no objection.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/8
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section 105(a) of the Code and section 157 of title 28 to determine and
enforce contempt orders1m
VI. CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit's decision in Chateaugay followed the Supreme
Court's Ron Pair statutory construction directive, and the court's plain
meaning analysis is sound. The purpose of the statute-protecting both the
debtor and creditor by preventing violations of the automatic stay'2--is not
frustrated by this interpretation because a corporate debtor can pursue civil
contempt against a creditor who violates the automatic stay. The final
determination, however, is that the Second Circuit's holding in Chateaugay
is correct only if bankruptcy courts have the authority to determine and
enforce contempt, or in the alternative, have the authority to determine
contempt and then pass the matter to the district court for enforcement.'24
Although passing the matter to the district court is not as efficient as the
bankruptcy court directly enforcing the contempt, it will provide a disincentive
to a creditor of a corporate debtor who is considering violating the automatic
stay because the remedy of section 362(h) is only available to "individual"
debtors.' 25 As the preceding section indicates, bankruptcy courts either
decide and enforce contempt themselves, decide the contempt issue and pass
it to the district court for review and enforcement, or certify the issue to the
district court. In any instance, corporate debtors should have redress against
creditors who violate the automatic stay.
Corporate debtors may, however, still be disadvantaged by the
Chateaugaydecision even if its creditors are found in civil contempt. Section
362(h) allows individuals to recover punitive damages for violations of the
automatic stay. To recover punitive damages, a corporate debtor would have

1d. at 673-74.
122. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Chester, 71 Bankr. 36, 39 (N.D. Tex. 1987); In re
Hulon, 92 Bankr. 670, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); Dubin v. Jakobowski (In re
Stephen W. Grosse, P.C.), 84 Bankr. 377, 386-87 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re
Kennedy, 80 Bankr. 673 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987).
123. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.

124. Resolution of this issue, including whether bankruptcy courts can constitutionally exercise contempt power, has been the subject of numerous court opinions and
is beyond the scope of this Note.
125. But see supra note 121 which indicates that a finding of contempt by a
bankruptcy court will not affect a contemnor's actions unless the bankruptcy courts
have enforcement powers.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 8

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

to initiate criminal contempt proceedings. 17 It is not certain whether
bankruptcy courts have the authority to determine criminal contempt. 2 7
MARY E. NORTON

126. Criminal contempt is used to punish for "disobedience of a court order." In
re Kennedy, 80 Bankr. 674, 675 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987).
127. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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